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ARE ECONOMIC IDEAS A SUSTAINABLE 








In this essay I claim that productive markets need not necessarily involve clearly 
defined and enforced property rights, upon which a price system can be used to allocate 
resources. I shall pursue this thought by an examination of the mechanisms that facilitate 
the exchange of economic ideas, and link academic norms to the emerging theoretical 




“Along with a sense of awe and gratitude for the good fortune of having received this 
remarkable gift from the past, we shall do well to maintain a sobering awareness of the 
extent  to  which  our  future  welfare  has  come  to  depend  upon  the  continued  smooth 
workings of an intricate, imperfectly understood piece of social machinery – one that 
need  have  no  adequate  capabilities  for  self-repair,  but  readily  may  be  damaged  by 
careless interventions.” 
David, P, 2001, p10 
 
In this essay I claim that productive markets need not necessarily involve clearly 
defined and enforced property rights, upon which a price system can be used to allocate 
resources. I shall pursue this thought by an examination of the mechanisms that facilitate 
the exchange of economic ideas, and link academic norms to the emerging theoretical 
justification for open source software, and “free culture”. 
The chain of logic will be that a relaxation ofc property law in the realm of culture 
would be efficient. I then offer evidence to suggest that journals are governed by the same 
“ethos and norms of disclosure” (David, 2001) as the movement behind free culture. 
It is important to state that I will confine my study to the field of economics, and to 
analyze  it  given  the  institutional  framework  in  which  academic  discourse  resides. 
Alternative subjects may charge authors to submit articles – as in the case of Biology – 
and this might be more efficient than a system of free submissions. Indeed any efficiency 
within  economics  might  not  be  genuine,  and  merely  appears  so  due  to  lavish 
governmental subsidy of higher education. Such questions are important, but beyond the 
scope  of  this  initial  paper.  Only  once  the  exchange  of  economic  ideas  is  better 
understood, can a comparative study be possible. 
Part II will look beyond the ideology of open source software and suggest that it is 
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comparable to economic property. By looking at the history of “open science” however, it 
still remains closer to communal than many economists might believe to be efficient. 
Part III will explore the free culture movement by looking at the licenses that move 
property  rights  from  “all  rights  reserved”  to  “some  rights  reserved”.  The  Creative 
Commons and GNU license will be delved into. I will claim that this development is a 
classic solution to Hobbesian anarchy, and an attempt to voluntarily contract away from 
predation/ protection to enable production. 
Part IV will analyze the primary means to exchange economic ideas: journals. I will 
claim that the principal determinant of a competitive industry is contestability, and trace a 
history  of  journal  emergence  to  gage  how  responsive  the  market  is  to  changing 
conditions. Apart from the barriers to entry I will also look at refereeing as a medium of 
exchange absent of pricing, and suggest reasons for its ability to contribute to the quality 
of articles. 
Part V will look at branding in academia, given the crucial role of reputation as a 
substitute for pricing. In this light, much “pedantic” squabbling over terminology can 
be better understood. 
Part VI acknowledges the opportunity for economist’s to earn vast sums per article 
in  non-academic  exchange.  I  will  make  a  distinction  between  “articulation”  and 
“creation”  of  economic  ideas  and  suggest  that  economist’s  can  earn  income  from 
complementary, traditional exchange mechanisms. 
Part VII concludes. 
 
II. Open Science and Open Source 
 
Open Science can be traced to relatively recent changes in the institutional structure 
that supports the quest for frontiers of scientific enquiry. It displaced a practice of secrecy 
where  competing  researchers  attempted  to  hide,  and  internalize,  their  findings.  The 
movement toward a Republic of Science
1 in the c16th and c17th: 
 
“should be seen as a distinctive and vital aspect of the Scientific Revolution, from 
which  there  crystallized  a  new  set  of  social  conventions,  incentive  structures,  and 
institutional  mechanisms  that  reinforced  scientific  researchers’  commitments  to  rapid 
disclosure and wider dissemination of their new discoveries and inventions.” 
David, P, 2001, p3 
 
Open Science has an undeniably communal ethos, with the belief that the method of 
acquiring knowledge is a social process, a conversation characterized by universalism. 
Universalism has two components. Firstly, that it must be open to entry and socially 
accessible;  establishing  the  mechanism  of  reputations.  “The  norm  of  ‘openness’  is 
‘incentive combatable’ with a collegiate reputational reward system based upon accepted 
claims  to  priority”
2    and  offers  reason  to  willingly  disperse  knowledge.  The  other 
component  of  universalism  is  full  disclosure  of  methods,  so  that  replication  and 
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verification is possible
1. Notice the similarities to the open source coding: freedom to 
tinker and emphasis on reproduction. In spite of the rhetoric, however, there are reasons 
to believe that free and open source software, and Open Science itself is closer to a 
private property system than is assumed. Tellingly, the Open Source Initiative says: 
 
“We think the economic self-interest arguments for open source are strong enough 




This suggests that much “communal” rhetoric can obscure the economic functioning 
of  the  market.  Precisely  this  study  was  attempted  by  Chiao  where  he  advocates  a 
distinction between legal and economic ownership: 
 
“the exclusive right, recognized by the community at large, to re-distribute modified 
versions  of  that  software  …  is  not  inconsistent  with  the  Alchian-Cheung  general 
definition of property rights” 
Chiao, 2003 
 
This insight can be used to explore the transition of the Chinese economy, and view 
it as an increasingly market based system with communist rhetoric. One way in which 
free and open source software can be considered private property is the release of source 
code, and the retaining of trade secrets. Whilst a scientist publishes methods of research 
there will always be elements that can remain privately known, be they actual methods or 
mere peculiarities of personal style. Even these can be open to scrutiny
3, and the point is 
to  align  Open  Science  to  the  Open  Source  methodology.  Even  with  a  full  list  of 
references and disclosure of theory, an author has an income extraction right with regard 
to technique. Whilst the explicit overtones overemphasize the communal nature of both, 
neither are traditional markets. My claim is that there are two parties, both of which are 
misinformed: 
·  Ideological  collectivists,  who  fail  to  appreciate  the  source  of  efficiency  is 
substitute mechanisms for traditional exchange 
·  Ideological individualists, who fail to notice the informal communal nature of 
scientific Enquiry 
 
III. Free Culture 
 
The consequences of the Internet’s triumphant ubiquity are immense. Perhaps the 
biggest  impact  of  the  digital  age  has  been  with  regard  to  property  law:  low  cost 
replications of files, and the ability to exchange them between computers explode the 
instances of copyright violation. A debate on intellectual property (IP) rages, and poses an 
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3 Posner has written about Coase, and Tollison about Buchanan. T. Clark Durant informs me 
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  46 
interesting dilemma by forcing people to choose between freedom and property. Usually 
property  is  seen  as  the  foundation  upon  which  freedom  exists,  and  that  the  two  are 
complements.  Sometimes,  however,  they  can  conflict.  It  is  a  common  mistake  to 
associate  “free”  with  “zero  cost”,  and  we  do  no  such  thing  here.  “Free  Culture”  is 
equivalent to “free trade” or “freedom” implying above all liberty and rights. In his book 
‘Free Culture
1’ Lawrence Lessig opens with the case of the Causbys; North Carolina 
farmers. They made a legal challenge against government aircraft trespassing on their 
“land”, since American law held that a property right extended to “an indefinite extent, 
upwards
2”. The verdict was: 
 
“[The] doctrine has no place in the modern world. The air is a public highway, as 
Congress has declared. Were that not true, every transcontinental flight would subject the 
operator to countless trespass suits. Common sense revolts at the idea. To recognize such 
private  claims  to  airspace  would  clog  these  highways,  seriously  interfere  with  their 
control and development in the public interest, and transfer into private ownership that to 
which only the public has a just claim” 
United States vs Causby, U.S. 328,1946, 256,261 
 
Lessig acknowledges the valid property claim regarding a decrease in property value 
for being in a flight path, but the point is that just as aircrafts had done before, the Internet 
is forcing a radical update of property law. Previously a copyright meant, “All rights 
reserved”,  meaning  that  permission  must  be  acquired  prior  to  use.  The  Creative 
Commons
3 is a “some rights reserved” license where permission is implied. A contributor 
will choose a license based on the following criteria: 
·  Attribution 
·  Commercial use 
·  Modifications 
The difficulty of implementing a new legal structure is the special interests of those 
who’s property is under threat. A Free Culture is a classic example of an attempt to write 
a Constitutional contract to step out of a Hobbesian anarchy
4. The extent of litigation for 
IP  infringement,  and  the  unseen  reductions  in  production  demonstrate  a 
predation/protection system. Of course the problem in achieving voluntary contracting is 
that there is no Veil of Ignorance: the players know precisely what they stand to lose. 
 
“Copyright may be property, but like all property, it is also a form of regulation. It is 
a regulation that benefits some and harms others. When done right, it benefits creators 
and harms leeches. When done wrong, it is the regulation the powerful use to defeat 
competitors” 
Lessig, 2004, p194 
 
A solution will not be easy, but the relevance to academia, and the exchange of 
                                                            
1 The catalyst for the Free Culture movement 
2 See Lessig (2004, Introduction) 
3 http://www.creativecommons.org 
4 See Buchanan (1975)  
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economic ideas relates to the emergence of the Free Culture movement, and the Internet 
generally. Academics were instrumental in the early creation and expanse of the Internet, 
and there’s evidence to suggest that the norms of journal debate is the driving force 
behind the attack on copyright. HTML links are conceptually identical to citations, and 
both academics and “bloggers” are habitually governed into giving credit to other sources 
in the belief that doing so strengthens the system. 
It is my belief that the Free Culture movement, and the Creative Commons license is 
introducing  the  norms  and  structure  of  academic  discourse  to culture  at  large.  When 
writing a paper the permission to cite a past paper is implied: you do not have to track 
down each individual author. This is acceptable because it won’t be used for commercial 
gain, and/or the end product will be a sufficiently unique derivation. 
In a critique of the Open Source movement Richard Epstein centers his argument on 
the lack of a capital structure
1. Indeed a commons will collapse when individuals realize 
that  they  cannot  withdraw  their  productive  value,  but  non-rivalry  is  the  fundamental 
characteristic of software. The commune is no poorer from the withdrawal of the harvest. 
Indeed  currently  there  is  no  shortage  of  bandwidth,  so  the  lighthouse  harbor  is 
expandable. Demsetz may have the last laugh, and pricing per download may alter the 
institutional structure of Open Source software however my analysis remains firmly in 
the now. Besides, as Part V. will demonstrate the lack of clear property rights does not 
obstruct the development of capital structure. 
Economists  have  the  same  incentives  to  contribute  to  economic  knowledge  as 
software developers have to create open-source programs, and the medium to do so is 
journals. 
 
IV. The Mechanism of Exchange: Journals 
 
a.  Historical Perspective
2 
 
In the 17th and 18th Century political science was articulated via privately produced 
books  and  pamphlets
3.  The  first  journals,  Journal  des  Savants  and  Philosophical 
Transactions of the Royal Society emerged in response to the abundance of thought. They 
did not print original essays, rather reviewed and filtered those that existed. The first 
journal that we would recognize was the Encyclopedia: it was theoretical, bound, regular, 
subscribed  to,  and  offered  little  private  pecuniary  gain  to  the  originator.  The  social 
conditions of the time played an important role in the feasibility of this journal. The 
enlightenment changed the nature of demand for academic thought, as educated scholars 
engaged in debate, and the middle classes sought to better themselves. 
In the early 19th century the specialized journals for economics seems to disappear. 
I’m  not  sure  why.  Smith,  Ricardo  and  Say  wrote  books,  and  there  was  a  return  to 
pamphlets. This precipitated the rise of the newspaper/magazines such as The Economist, 
                                                            
1 See Epstein (2004). 
2  This  chronology  of  Journals  has  been  heavily  influenced  by  The  Newschool, 
http://homepage.newschool.edu/het/ 
3  Whether  journals  were  privately  or  publicly  produced  is  an  interesting  but  irrelevant 
diversion to my study. I am more concerned with the actual exchange mechanism.  
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who spoke of economics affairs, but in a highly relevant manner. 
The rise of the modern journal can be attributed to the explosion of universities and 
their quest for reputation. Johns Hopkins, Chicago, MIT and the LSE needed means to 
demonstrate their worthiness, and an in-house journal was an essential tool of controlled 
self-promotion. Having changed the landscape of the debate, Cambridge and Harvard 
were forced to respond and engage. Also, this period saw a fundamental attack on the 
credibility  of  “economics”  as  a  discipline.  The  Quarterly  Journal  of  Economics  was 
launched  by  Harvard  in  1886,  in  1890  Chicago  introduced  The  Journal  of  Political 
Economy, a year later the Royal Economic Society was founded who would create the 
Economic Journal and 1911 saw the American Economic Association, the controllers of 
the American Economic Review. 
Going  back  to  the  origin of  Open  Science, intellectuals received  patronage  from 
ruling families because: 
 
“It  was  very  much  in  the  interest  of  a  patron  for  the  reputations  of  those  he 
patronized to be enhanced in this way, for their fame augmented his own” 
David, 2001, p.6 
 
Indeed  there’s  a  mutual  enhancement  of  reputation  in  the  relationship  between 
scholar and institution, and creating a journal is means to bolster the reputation of faculty, 
and in doing so, the university as a whole. 
The point was to promote their own institution, and Editors were highly selective in 
achieving that end. They were the voice of the institution, and intended to outperform 
their rivals. They were promoting their own brand, but the “market” was competitive. It 
was competitive, because it was contestable. 
The LSE created Economica as a means to challenge Cambridge orthodoxy, and 
the classic institutional confrontation found battleground in the journals. Keynes’ 
revival of the EJ fortunes was a direct result of his arguments with Hayek, and then the 
Stockholm challenge. Other countries entered the market for ideas, and journals erupted 
in  research  institutes  and  indeed  banks.  Econometrica  was  entered  as  a  vent  for 
economists who wanted to publish more mathematical models and soon most institutions 
had an in house journal. 
Laband  and  Piette  found  that  from  1970-1990  membership  of  the  American 
Economic Association rose by 14%, but the amount of articles written increased by 23% 
and there was a 50% rise in published pages. From 1976-85 an additional 51% of journals 
had entered the market; and these figures corresponded to Lovell’s survey from 1850-
1969. They say: 
 
“It seems clear that market entry must be responsible for a substantial proportion of 
the noted growth in citations” 
Laband and Piette,1994, p652-53 
 
Contestability remained. Specialization meant a continuing flow of new journals for 
several reasons. The economics profession itself was expanding, increasing the supply of  
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papers
1.  Where  professional  prestige  is  related  to  publications,  activity  increased. 
Commercial houses were happy to back new entrants, because university libraries were 
insatiable consumers. Ever more heterodox journals were created, and as means to filter 
the bountiful crop, survey journals such as the Journal of Economic Perspectives were 
formed. 
Modern journals are now electronic, for example the Electronic Society for Social 
Sciences
2  offer  a  journal  50%  cheaper  than  most,  and  Econ  Journal  Watch
3  further 
supports the contestability claim and shows journals to be imaginative and responsive. 
The  market  seems  to  be  contestable,  but  it’s  efficiency  depends  on  the  process  of 
publication. 
 
b.  Editing and Refereeing 
 
Hammermesh
4 found that referees are heavily cited and at the peak of their careers. 
Editors choose to use the top people in their specialty, and those whom they have access 
to. Apart from when the submission comes from an elite author, there’s no correlation 
between the citations of the author and referee. In other words, referees are not assigned 
to authors of similar quality. Hammermesh catalogues referees into three groups: a “doer” 
offers quick feedback; a “refuser” declines the invitation but does so promptly, and a 
“loser” who hangs on to a paper drastically slowing the review process. 5% of delinquent 
referees accounted for half of the 10% of articles that are held up for ten months or more. 
Consequently, a slow response from a referee will be either down to the bad luck of 
getting a “loser”, or the better fortune of reaching an experienced scholar where the delay 
is offset by valuable feedback. Also, since the better journals will use better referees, an 
article submitted to a higher ranked journal will end up being a better paper. 
Overall, 50% of refereed feedback is received within 6 weeks, and 75% within 10. 
Much of the perceived inefficiency in the system stems not from the refereeing stage, 
therefore, but the publishing stage. Many journals operate on a quarterly schedule, and 
Marshall
5 found that there’s a 3 month lag after all Editorial work is finished. 
Aside  from  acting  as  gatekeepers  it  is  important  to  note  the  middleman  role  of 
journal editors. Because economic ideas are such a commons, a credibility issue arises. 
Such vast circulations of ideas call for some institutional means to sort, and signal the 
appropriate ones requiring attention. With the advent of blogging, we can expect to see 
similar measures emerge to mimic journal editors. When opinion has such a low cost to 
share, those with rich things to say have an incentive to devise significantly high barriers, 
and  form  the  networks  that  signal  academic  inclusion.  Networks  not  only  provide 
warranty against academic deceit, they offer positive returns to editors that use them to 
“capture” good articles
6. Such evidence is contrary to an “old boys” story.  It  is also 
important to note the facility journals provide emerging fields. 
                                                            
1 Lovell (1973) calculated output to double every 14 years 
2 http://www.elsss.org.uk/. 
3 http://www.econjournalwatch.org/main/index.php. 
4 Hammermesh (1994). 
5 Marshall (1959). 
6 See Laband, D and Piette, M. (1994).  
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“An important ingredient in the success of law and economics research has come 




That said, marginalization might stifle the creative flow of ideas necessary to nourish 
a  field.  Anecdotal  evidence  suggest  that  Vernon  Smith  was  reluctant  to  establish  a 
dedicated journal to experimental economics, and much criticism of the modern Austrian 
School stems from the confines of their influence. My point is that the market is ripe for 
entrepreneurial manipulation. 
 
c.  Suggestions 
 
Hammermesh suggests a bribe to referees to speed up responses, but accepts that 
when tried they’ve had little impact on “losers”, the main source of delay. Zetland
2 goes 
further, and proposes an auction market for journal articles. He acknowledges that for-
profit publishing has had little impact thus far, and constructs a system where articles are 
bid for, and citations receive income. He wishes to better compensate the Shoulders of 
Giants. 
I believe most of the suggestions for improvement are instigated by an assumption 
that a pricing system is more efficient than the current institutional structure. I am less 
convinced, and believe there’s real evidence to suggest that the journal market is efficient 
as it is. Specifically, the greatest lag in bringing articles to market concerns publishing 
constraints.  Since  academia  is  already  so  well intertwined  with  the  Internet,  scholars 
should embrace the open content approach to generating knowledge. The journal market 
has proved to be very adaptable, and as researchers move away from hard copies toward 
digital content further change is needed. Economist’s have always exchanged papers with 
a relaxed “some rights reserved” license, and have a significantly lower transitional gains 
trap compared to culture at large. J-Stors worth is not so much in its property right, rather 
it’s central administration that facilitates search. Before a paper is distributed, however, 
some degree of sorting will need to take place. And there can be no mistake that the 
forces that have ensured the dominance of leading journals can survive in an institution of 
even freer exchange, and reputation mechanisms are the crucial reason why. 
 
V. Branding and other reputation effects 
 
One of the principle reasons for the success of the Journal of Economic Perspectives 
was the fact that the “AEA puts its credibility and reputational capital on the line with a 
new journal. This serves as an implicit guarantee of product quality.”
3  Not only is 
reputation the driving factor behind the rise and fall of journals, but no economist works 
in anonymity. Recognition is crucial, since the proxy for “impact” is citations. Whilst 
institutions are a signal about a scholars credentials, his surname carriers the weight of his 
reputation. The alphabetical arrangement of references is not by chance, and reflects the 
                                                            
1 source currently unknown 
2 Zetland (2004). 
3 Laband, D and Piette, M (1994, p. 653).  
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categorization  of  authors.  Reputations  demonstrate  that  there  is  a  capital  structure  to 
economic ideas, and it can be increased by writing heavily cited articles in respected 
journals, or diminished by distributing it too thinly across low impact co-authorships. The 
economist  will  optimize  his  portfolio  by  choosing  a  combination  of  sole-authorship 
“impact” papers and investing in the capital of students by writing jointly. 
A means to earn high returns on reputational capital would be to create a theory that 
bears  your  name,  and  then  even  though  you  receive  no  pecuniary  income  from  it’s 
application, there will be an increase in your reputation, and a corresponding prospect of 
tenure ship at a high ranked institution, for a large salary. But consider the distinction 
between “Keynesian Economics” and “The Economics of Keynes”. A similar tale can be 
told  regarding  “The  Coase  Theory
1”.  In  both  situations,  debate  rages  regarding  the 
alignment of individual to theory. In light of reputation capital, this is a very important 
and understandable situation. Without pecuniary exchange, academic squabbles result and 
the competitive “expert” market of academic debate exists instead of a democratic market 
where rights go to the highest bidder. 
Whilst not often explicitly stated, these insights are implicitly understood as some 
schools of thought align themselves to individual authors (and then the debate concerns 
“what he said” which is relatively verifiable, although then time passes and the question 
becomes “what he meant” or “what he would have said”). Other schools have explicit 
tenets or beliefs, but to function efficiently these must be common knowledge, and are 
open to misinterpretation. Again, as time passes the network of scholars that tacitly knew 
the methodological foundations dissipates and arguments are more likely to grow. To pre-
empt  this,  notice  how  the  New  Institutional  Economics  movement  attempt  to  define 
themselves clearly. As knowledge, generally, increases there are incentives to protect 
reputational capital by codification and formalization. Most of the economic literature on 
methodology falls into this category. 
 
VI. Levels of Economic Ideas: Creation, Articulation and Repetition 
 
Thus far we have concentrated on the exchange of economic ideas, specifically via 
journals, but there is a theoretical distinction between production and exchange. Journals 
play a significant role in the production of economic ideas, but primarily tend to exchange 
encapsulated  works.  Such  works  will  either  cement  previous  theory  with  a  temporal 
restatement; assemble fragments of previous theory into a sufficiently original derivation, 
or  push  the  frontier  with  genuine  advancement
2.  An  individual  article  will  therefore 
require a productive stage prior to submission, even in expectation of useful feedback 
from  the  refereeing  process.  Institutions  such  as  seminars,  conferences  and  private 
correspondence will act as the productive stage. But economist’s written output extends 
far beyond refereed articles, and this is because the exchange of economic ideas exists 
                                                            
1 This leads to the interesting case where a concept become so imbedded it no longer requires 
citation. Here lies the importance of the name since there will still be a means to arrive at the 
original source. Presumably the passage from requiring citation to being taken as given will have 
already conferred prestige upon the author. I can’t think of many people who’ve lent their names 
to theorems within their lifetime and not received prestige. 
2 See Oakeshott (1975).  
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along a spectrum of  <<knowledge>>, and maps directly into the commons/private type 
of market. 
The creation of economic ideas is the academic process of production and exchange 
via scholarly journals. As I have demonstrated, this is currently arranged in a non-market 
setting and is contestable and innovative. So close to such abstract notions as “ideas” and 
“thought”  policing  of  a  property  rights  regime  would  be  vastly  expensive,  and  stifle 
creativity. Proxies such as reputation capital have emerged, to facilitate the flow. Freely 
available papers and pamphlets are strong examples of creativity, where the intention is a 
broad audience and few restrictions on replication. 
The articulation of economic ideas spans journals and more popular press. A step 
away from the frontier of research, articulation moves toward a conventional market type; 
for example Cato use a price mechanism. At one extreme it is articulation that includes 
clarifications and assemblies of ideas, for example review articles, think-tank pieces and 
the emergence of journals that facilitate them. Another extreme is books, since these can 
be governed as a combination of copyright license. 
The repetition of economic ideas concerns the introduction of settled thought into a 
new forum, or indeed repeating already known ideas. Many economists earn money per 
article,  and  participate  in  a  traditional  market  just  as  most  journalists  do.  But  their 
audience is noneconomist, and therefore by definition op-eds are not academic. Immense 
private wealth can be gained by engaging in market activity like private speaking and 
books,  but these  are  not efficient  means  at  dialogue  within an  academic  community. 
These are profits not for the creation of economic thought, but an ability to discuss them 
with a wide audience. Academic discourse is a fundamentally different type of market, 
and is efficiently governed by fundamentally different mechanisms of exchange. 
 
VII. Concluding Comments 
 
Professional attention to the governance of academia is surprisingly sparse. This has 
been a preliminary and speculative attempt to replace casual anecdote with an interesting 
theoretical  understanding.  In  a  world  of  such  change,  provincialism  of  time  is 
understandable yet dangerous. In private correspondence I have learnt that Jstor will soon 
be cross-referencing all of it’s articles, and incorporate a “track back” facility. Just as can 
currently be done on the Internet, an article will not only include the tradition list of 
references, but will include a list of articles that have since cited the original. There can 
be no denying that Jstor is the Napster of academia but one that falls within copyright law 
due to the open source foundation of modern science. As we beat on with the current, 
bound  ceaselessly  into  the  future…  the  blossoming  economists  will  appreciate  and 
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